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Abstract
Recommendation systems are information-filtering systems that tailor information to users on the basis of knowledge about
their preferences. The ability of these systems to profile users is what enables such intelligent functionality, but at the same time,
it is the source of serious privacy concerns. In this paper we investigate a privacy-enhancing technology that aims at hindering
an attacker in its efforts to accurately profile users based on the items they rate. Our approach capitalizes on the combination of
two perturbative mechanisms—the forgery and the suppression of ratings. While this technique enhances user privacy to a certain
extent, it inevitably comes at the cost of a loss in data utility, namely a degradation of the recommendation’s accuracy. In short,
it poses a trade-off between privacy and utility.
The theoretical analysis of said trade-off is the object of this work. We measure privacy as the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the user’s and the population’s item distributions, and quantify utility as the proportion of ratings users consent to forge
and eliminate. Equipped with these quantitative measures, we find a closed-form solution to the problem of optimal forgery and
suppression of ratings, and characterize the optimal trade-off surface among privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate. Experimental
results on a popular recommendation system show how our approach may contribute to privacy enhancement.
Index Terms
Information privacy, Kullback-Leibler divergence, user profiling, privacy-enhancing technologies, data perturbation, recom-
mendation systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web, the amount of information available to users has grown exponentially.
As a result, the ability to find information relevant for their interests has become a central issue in recent years. In this context
of information overload, recommendation systems arise to provide information tailored to users on the basis of knowledge
about their preferences [2]. In essence, a recommendation system may be regarded as a type of information-filtering system
that suggests information items users may be interested in. Examples of such systems include recommending music at Last.fm
and Pandora Radio, movies by MovieLens and Netflix, videos at YouTube, news at Digg and Google News, and books and
other products at Amazon.
Most of these systems capitalize on the creation of profiles that represent interests and preferences of users. Such profiles
are the result of the collection and analysis of the data that users communicate to those systems. A distinction is frequently
made between explicit and implicit forms of data collection. The most popular form of explicit data collection is that users
communicate their preferences by rating items. This is the case of many of the applications mentioned above, where users
assign ratings to songs, movies or news they have already listened, watched or read. Other strategies to capture users’ interests
include asking them to sort a number of items by order of predilection, or suggesting that they mark the items they like.
On the other hand, recommendation systems may collect data from users without requiring them to explicitly convey their
preferences [3]. These practices comprise observing the items clicked by users in an online store, analyzing the time it takes
users to examine an item, or simply keeping a record of the purchased items.
The prolonged collection of these personal data allows the system to extract an accurate snapshot of user interests, i.e.,
their profiles. With this invaluable source of information, the recommendation system applies some technique [4] to generate a
prediction of users’ interests for those items they have not yet considered. For example, Movielens and Digg use collaborative-
filtering techniques to predict the rating that a user would give to a movie and to create a personalized list of recommended
news, respectively. In a nutshell, the ability of profiling users based on such personal information is precisely what enables
the intelligent functionality of those systems.
Despite the many advantages recommendation systems are bringing to users, the information collected, processed and stored
by these systems prompts serious privacy concerns. One of the main privacy risks perceived by users is that of a computer
“figuring things out” about them [5]. Many users are worried about the idea that their profiles may reveal sensitive information
such as health-related issues, political preferences, salary or religion. Such privacy risk is exacerbated especially when these
profiles are combined across several information services or enriched with data from social networks. An illustrative example
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Fig. 1: The profile of a user is modeled in Movielens as a histogram of absolute frequencies of ratings within a set of movie genres (bottom). Based on this
profile, the recommender predicts the rating that the user would probably give to a movie (top). After having watched the movie, the user rates it and their
profile is updated.
is [6], which demonstrates that it is possible to unveil sensitive information about a person from their movie rating history
by cross-referencing data from other sources. The authors analyzed the Netflix Prize data set [7], which contained anonymous
movie ratings of around half a million users of Netflix, and were able to uncover the identity, political leaning and even sexual
orientation of some of those users, by simply correlating their ratings with reviews they posted on the popular movie Web site
IMDb. Apart from the risk of cross-referencing, users are also concerned that the system’s predictions may be totally erroneous
and be later used to defame them. This latter situation is examined in [8], where the accuracy of the predictions provided by
TiVo digital video recorder and Amazon is questioned. Lastly, other privacy risks embrace unsolicited marketing, information
leaked to other users of the same computer, court subpoenas, and government surveillance [5].
As a result of all this, it is not surprising that some users are reticent to reveal their interests. In fact, [9] reports that the 24%
of Internet users surveyed provided false information in order to avoid giving private information to a Web site. Alternatively,
another study [10] finds that 95% of the respondents refused, at some point, to provide personal information when requested by
a Web site. In closing, these studies seem to indicate that submitting false information and refusing to give private information
are strategies accepted by users concerned with their privacy.
A. Contribution and Plan of this Paper
In this paper we approach the problem of protecting user privacy in those recommendation systems that profile users on the
basis of the items they rate. Given the willingness of users to provide fake information and elude disclosing private data,
we investigate a privacy-enhancing technology (PET) that combines these two forms of data perturbation, namely the forgery
and the suppression of ratings. Concordantly, in our scenario users rate those items they have an opinion on. However, in
order to avoid being accurately profiled by the recommender or, in general, by any privacy attacker capable of collecting
this information, users may wish to refrain from rating some of those items and/or rate items that do not reflect their actual
preferences. Our approach thus protects user privacy to a certain degree, without having to trust the recommendation system
or the network operator, but at the cost a loss in utility, a degradation of the quality of the recommendation. In other words,
our PET poses a trade-off between privacy and utility.
The theoretical analysis of the trade-off between these two contrasting aspects is the object of this work. We tackle the issue
in a systematic fashion, drawing upon the methodology of multiobjective optimization. Before proceeding, though, we adopt a
quantifiable measure of user privacy—the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the probability distribution of the user’s
items and the population’s distribution, a criterion that we introduced in previous work [11] and justified and interpreted in [12],
[13] by leveraging on the rationale behind entropy-maximization methods. Equipped with a measure of both privacy and utility,
we formulate an optimization problem modeling the trade-off between privacy on the one hand, and on the other forgery rate
and suppression rate as utility metrics. Our extensive theoretical analysis finds a closed-form solution to the problem of optimal
forgery and suppression of ratings, and characterizes the optimal trade-off between the aspects of privacy and utility.
In addition, we provide an empirical evaluation of our data-perturbative approach. Specifically, we apply the forgery and
the suppression of ratings in the popular movie recommendation system Movielens, and show how these two strategies may
preserve the privacy of its users.
Sec. II reviews several data-perturbative approaches aimed at enhancing user privacy in the context of recommender systems.
Sec. III introduces our privacy-enhancing technology, proposes a quantitative measure of the privacy of user profiles, and
formulates the trade-off between privacy and utility. Sec. IV presents a theoretical analysis of the optimization problem
3characterizing the privacy-forgery-suppression trade-off. In this same section we also provide a numerical example that illustrates
our formulation and theoretical results. Sec. V evaluates our privacy-protecting mechanism in a real recommendation system.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. VI.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Numerous approaches have been proposed to protect user privacy in the context of recommendation systems. These approaches
fundamentally suggest either perturbing the information provided by users or using cryptographic techniques.
In the case of perturbative methods for recommendation systems, [14] proposes that users add random values to their ratings
and then submit these perturbed ratings to the recommender. After receiving these ratings, the system executes an algorithm
and sends the users some information that allows them to compute the prediction. When the number of participating users is
sufficiently large, the authors find that user privacy is protected to a certain extent and the system reaches a decent level of
accuracy. However, even though a user disguises all their ratings, it is evident that the items themselves may uncover sensitive
information. Simply put, the mere fact of showing interest in a certain item may be more revealing than the rating assigned
to that item. For instance, a user rating a book called “How to Overcome Depression” indicates a clear interest in depression,
regardless of the score assigned to this book. Apart from this critique, other works [15], [16] stress that the use of randomized
data distortion techniques might not be able to preserve privacy.
In line with this work, [17] applies the same data-perturbative technique to collaborative-filtering algorithms based on singular-
value decomposition. Specifically, the authors focus on the impact that their technique has on privacy. For this purpose, they
use the privacy metric proposed by [18], which is essentially equivalent to differential entropy, and conduct some experiments
with data sets from Movielens and Jester. The results show the trade-off curve between accuracy in recommendations and
privacy. In particular, they measure accuracy as the mean absolute error between the predicted values from the original ratings
and the predictions obtained from the perturbed ratings.
At this point, we would like to remark that the use of perturbative techniques is by no means new in other scenarios
such as private information retrieval and the semantic Web. In the former scenario, users send general-purpose queries to an
information service provider. A perturbative approach to protect user profiles in this context consists in combining genuine with
false queries. Precisely, [11] proposes a nonrandomized method for query forgery and investigates the trade-off between privacy
and the additional traffic overhead. In the semantic Web scenario, users annotate resources with the purpose of classifying
them. In this application domain, the perturbation of user profiles for privacy preservation may be carried out by dropping
certain annotations or tags. An example of this kind of perturbation may be found in [19]–[21], where the authors propose the
elimination of tags as a privacy-enhancing strategy.
Regarding the use of cryptographic techniques, [22], [23] propose a method that enables a community of users to calculate
a public aggregate of their profiles without revealing them on an individual basis. In particular, the authors use a homomorphic
encryption scheme and a peer-to-peer communication protocol for the recommender to perform this calculation. Once the
aggregated profile is computed, the system sends it to users, who finally use local computation to obtain personalized
recommendations. This proposal prevents the system or any external attacker from ascertaining the individual user profiles.
However, its main handicap is assuming that an acceptable number of users is online and willing to participate in the protocol. In
line with this, [24] uses a variant of Pailliers’ homomorphic cryptosystem which improves the efficiency in the communication
protocol. Another solution [25] presents an algorithm aimed at providing more efficiency by using the scalar product protocol.
III. PRIVACY PROTECTION VIA FORGERY AND SUPPRESSION OF RATINGS
In this section, first we present the forgery and the suppression of ratings as a privacy-enhancing technology. The description
of our approach is prefaced by a brief introduction of the concepts of soft privacy and hard privacy. Secondly, we propose a
model of user profile and set forth our assumptions about the adversary capabilities. Finally, we provide a quantitative measure
of both privacy and utility, and present a formulation of the trade-off between these two contrasting aspects.
A. Soft Privacy vs. Hard Privacy
The privacy research literature [26] recognizes the distinction between the concepts of soft privacy and hard privacy. A
privacy-enhancing mechanism providing soft privacy assumes that users entrust their private data to an entity, which is
thereafter responsible for the protection of their data. In the literature, numerous attempts to protect privacy have followed the
traditional method of anonymous communications [27]–[30], which is fundamentally based on the suppositions of soft privacy.
Unfortunately, anonymous-communication systems are not completely effective [31]–[34], they normally come at the cost of
infrastructure, and assume that users are willing to trust other parties.
Our privacy-protecting technique, per contra, leverages on the principle of hard privacy, which assumes that users mistrust
communicating entities and therefore strive to reveal as little private information as possible. In the motivating scenario of
this work, hard privacy means that users need not trust an external entity such as the recommender or the network operator.
Consequently, because users just trust themselves, it is their own responsibility to protect their privacy. In this state of affairs,
the forgery and the suppression of ratings appear as a technique that may hinder privacy attackers in their efforts to accurately
4profile users on the basis of the items they rate. Specifically, when users are adhered to this technique, they have the possibility to
submit ratings to items that do not reflect their genuine preferences, and/or refrain from rating some items of their interest—this
is what we refer to as the forgery and the suppression of ratings, respectively.
B. User Profile and Adversary Model
In the scenario of recommendation systems, users rate items of a very different nature, e.g., music, pictures, videos or news,
according to their personal preferences. The information conveyed allows those systems to extract a profile of interests or user
profile, which turns to be essential in the provision of personalized recommendations.
We mentioned in Sec. I that Movielens represents user profiles by using some kind of histogram. Other systems such as Jinni
and Last.fm show this information by means of a tag cloud, which in essence may be regarded as another kind of histogram. In
this same spirit, recent privacy-protecting approaches in the scenario of recommendation systems also propose using histograms
of absolute frequencies for modeling user profiles [35], [36].
According to these examples and inspired by other works in the field [1], [11], [19]–[21], [37], we model the items rated
by users as random variables (r.v.’s) taking on values in a common finite alphabet of categories, namely the set {1, . . . , n} for
some integer n > 2. Concordantly, we model the profile of a user as a probability mass function (PMF) q = (q1, . . . , qn), that
is, a histogram of relative frequencies of items within a predefined set of categories of interest.
We would like to emphasize that, under this model, user profiles do not capture the particular scores given to items, but
what we consider to be more sensitive: the categories these items belong to. This is exactly the case of Movielens and
numerous content-based recommendation systems. Fig. 1 provides an example that illustrates how user profiles are constructed
in Movielens. In this particular example, a user assigns two stars to a movie, meaning that they consider it to be “fairly bad”.
However, the recommender updates their profile based only on the categories this movie belongs to.
According to this model, a privacy attacker supposedly observes a perturbed version of this profile, resulting from the forgery
and the suppression of certain ratings, and is unaware or ignores the fact that the observed user profile, also in the form of
a histogram, does not reflect the actual profile of interests of the user in question. In principle, our passive attacker could be
the recommender itself or the network operator. However, the set of potential attackers is not restricted merely to these two
entities. Since ratings are often publicly available to other users of the recommendation system, any other attacker able to
crawl through this information is taken into consideration in our adversary model.
When users adhere to the forgery and the suppression of ratings, they specify a forgery rate ρ ∈ [0,∞) and a suppression
rate σ ∈ [0, 1). The former is the ratio of forged ratings to total genuine ratings that a user consents to submit. The latter ratio
is the fraction of genuine ratings that the user agrees to eliminate (a). Note that, in our approach, the number of false ratings
submitted by the user can exceed the number of genuine ratings, that is, ρ can be greater than 1. Nevertheless, the number of
suppressed ratings is always lower than the number of genuine ratings.
By forging and suppressing ratings, the actual profile of interests q is then perceived from the outside as the apparent
PMF t = q+r−s1+ρ−σ , according to a forgery strategy r = (r1, . . . , rn) and a suppression strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn). Such strategies
represent the proportion of ratings that the user should forge and eliminate in each of the n categories. Naturally, these strategies
must satisfy, on the one hand, that ri > 0, si > 0 and qi + ri − si > 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, and on the other, that
∑n
i=1 ri = ρ
and
∑n
i=1 si = σ. In conclusion, the apparent profile is the result of the addition and the substraction of certain items to/from
the actual profile, and the posterior normalization by 11+ρ−σ so that
∑n
i=1 ti = 1.
C. Measuring the Privacy of User Profiles
Inspired by the privacy measures proposed in [11]–[13], [19], [38], and according to the model of user profile assumed in
Sec. III-B, we define initial privacy risk as the KL divergence [39] between the user’s genuine profile and the population’s
distribution, that is,
R0 = D(q ‖ p).
Similarly, we define (final) privacy risk R as the KL divergence between the user’s apparent profile and the population’s
distribution,
R = D(t ‖ p) = D
(
q + r − s
1 + ρ− σ
∥∥∥∥ p) .
An intuitive justification of our privacy metric stems from the observation that, whenever the user’s apparent item distribution
diverges too much from the population’s, a privacy attacker will have actually gained some information about the user, in contrast
to the statistics of the general population.
A richer argument may be found in [12], [13], where we establish some riveting connections between Jaynes’ rationale on
entropy-maximization methods and the use of entropies and divergences as measures of privacy. The leading idea is that the
method of types from information theory establishes an approximate monotonic relationship between the likelihood of a PMF
(a)The description of an architecture implementing this data-perturbative approach may be found in [1].
5in a stochastic system and its Shannon’s entropy. Loosely speaking and in our context, the higher the entropy of a profile,
the more likely it is, the more users behave similarly. This is in absence of a probability distribution model for the PMFs,
viewed abstractly as r.v.’s themselves. Under this interpretation, Shannon’s entropy is a measure of anonymity, not in the sense
that the user’s identity remains unknown, but only in the sense that higher likelihood of an apparent profile, believed by an
external observer to be the actual profile, makes that profile more common, helping the user go unnoticed, less interesting to
an attacker assumed to strive to target peculiar users.
If an aggregated histogram of the population were available as a reference profile, as we assume in this work, the extension
of Jaynes’ argument to relative entropy also gives an acceptable measure of privacy (or anonymity). Recall [39] that KL
divergence is a measure of discrepancy between probability distributions, which includes Shannon’s entropy as the special
case when the reference distribution is uniform. Conceptually, a lower KL divergence hides discrepancies with respect to a
reference profile, say the population’s, and there also exists a monotonic relationship between the likelihood of a distribution
and its divergence with respect to the reference distribution of choice, which enables us to regard KL divergence as a measure
of anonymity in a sense entirely analogous to the above mentioned.
D. Formulation of the Trade-Off among Privacy, Forgery and Suppression
Our data-perturbative mechanism allows users to enhance their privacy to a certain extent, since the resulting profile, as observed
from the outside, no longer captures their actual interests. The price to be paid, however, is a loss in data utility, in particular
in the accuracy of the recommender’s predictions.
For the sake of tractability, in this work we consider as utility metrics the forgery rate and the suppression rate. This
consideration enables us to formulate the problem of choosing a forgery strategy and a suppression strategy as a multiobjective
optimization problem that takes into account privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate. Specifically, under the assumption that
the population of users is large enough to neglect the impact of the choice of r and s on p, we define the privacy-forgery-
suppression function
R(ρ, σ) = min
r,s
ri>0, si>0,
qi+ri−si>0,∑
ri=ρ,
∑
si=σ
D
(
q + r − s
1 + ρ− σ
∥∥∥∥ p) , (1)
which characterizes the optimal trade-off among privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate.
Conceptually, the result of this optimization are two strategies r and s that contain information about which ratings should be
forged and which ones should be suppressed, in order to achieve the minimum privacy risk. More precisely, the component ri
is the percentage of items that the user should forge in the category i. The component si is defined analogously for suppression.
IV. OPTIMAL FORGERY AND SUPPRESSION OF RATINGS
This section is entirely devoted to the theoretical analysis of the privacy-forgery-suppression function (1) defined in Sec. III-D.
In our attempt to characterize the trade-off among privacy risk, forgery rate and suppression rate, we shall present a closed-
form solution to the optimization problem inherent in the definition of this function. Afterwards, we shall analyze some
fundamental properties of said trade-off. For the sake of brevity, our theoretical analysis only contemplates the case when all
given probabilities are strictly positive:
qi, pi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
Additionally, we suppose without loss of generality that
q1
p1
6 · · · 6 qn
pn
. (3)
Before diving into the mathematical analysis, it is immediate from the definition of the privacy-forgery-suppression function
that its initial value is R(0, 0) = D(q ‖ p). The characterization of the optimal trade-off surface modeled by R(ρ, σ) at any
other values of ρ and σ is the focus of this section.
A. Closed-Form Solution
Our first theorem, Theorem 3, will present a closed-form solution to the minimization problem involved in the definition of
function (1). The solution will be derived from Lemma 1, which addresses a resource allocation problem. This a theoretical
problem encountered in many fields, from load distribution and production planning to communication networks, computer
scheduling and portfolio selection [40]. Although this lemma provides a parametric-form solution, we shall be able to proceed
towards an explicit closed-form solution, albeit piecewise.
Lemma 1 (Resource Allocation): For all k = 1, . . . , n, let fk be a real-valued function on {(xk, yk) ∈ R2 : κk+xk−yk > 0},
twice differentiable in the interior of its domain. Assume that ∂fk∂xk = −
∂fk
∂yk
, that ∂
2fk
∂x2k
= ∂
2fk
∂y2k
> 0 and that the Hessian H(fk)
is positive semidefinite. Define hk = ∂fk∂xk . Because
∂hk
∂xk
> 0 and ∂hk∂yk < 0, it follows that hk is strictly increasing in xk and
6strictly decreasing in yk. Consequently, for a fixed yk, hk(xk, yk) is an invertible function of xk. Denote by h−1k the inverse
of hk(xk, 0). Suppose further that hk(xk, yk) = hk(xk − yk, 0) and finally that lim
xk↓yk−κk
hk(xk, yk) = −∞. Now consider the
following optimization problem in the variables x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn:
minimize
n∑
k=1
fk(xk, yk)
subject to xk, yk > 0,
κk + xk − yk > 0 for k = 1, . . . , n,
and
n∑
k=1
xk = η,
n∑
k=1
yk = θ for some η, θ > 0.
(i) The solution to the problem (x∗k, y
∗
k) depends on two real numbers ψ, ω that satisfy the equality constraints
∑
k x
∗
k = η
and
∑
k y
∗
k = θ. The solution exists provided that ψ 6 ω. If ψ < ω, then the solution is unique and yields
(x∗k, y
∗
k) =
(
max
{
0, h−1k (ψ)
}
,max
{
0,−h−1k (ω)
})
.
If ψ = ω, then there exists an infinite number of solutions of the form (x∗k + αk, y
∗
k + αk) for all αk ∈ R+ meeting the
two aforementioned equality constraints.
Without loss of generality, suppose that h1(0, 0) 6 · · · 6 hn(0, 0).
(ii) For ψ < ω, consider the following cases:
(a) hi(0, 0) < ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) for some i = 1, . . . , j − 1 and hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω < hj(0, 0) for some j = 2, . . . , n.
(b) hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω for j = n+ 1 and, either hi(0, 0) < ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) for some i = 1, . . . , n− 1 or hi(0, 0) < ψ for
i = n.
(c) ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) for i = 0 and, either hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω < hj(0, 0) for some j = 2, . . . , n or ω < hj(0, 0) for j = 1.
(d) hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω for j = n+ 1 and ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) for i = 0.
In each case, and for the corresponding indexes i and j,
x∗k =
{
h−1k (ψ) , k = 1, . . . , i
0 , k = i+ 1, . . . , n
,
y∗k =
{
0 , k = 1, . . . , j − 1
−h−1k (ω) , k = j, . . . , n
.
(iii) For ψ = ω, consider the following cases:
(a) either hi(0, 0) < ψ < hj(0, 0) for some j = 2, . . . , n and i = j − 1, or hi(0, 0) < ψ = hi+1(0, 0) = · · · =
hj−1(0, 0) < hj(0, 0) for some i = 1, . . . , j − 2 and some j = 3, . . . , n.
(b) for j = n + 1, either hi(0, 0) < hi+1(0, 0) = · · · = hj−1(0, 0) = ω for some i = 1, . . . , j − 2 or hj−1(0, 0) < ω
with i = n.
(c) for i = 0, either ψ = hi+1(0, 0) = · · · = hj−1(0, 0) < hj(0, 0) for some j = 2, . . . , n or ψ < hi+1(0, 0) with
j = 1.
In each case, and for the corresponding indexes i and j,
x∗k =
{
h−1k (ψ) + αk , k = 1, . . . , i
αk , k = i+ 1, . . . , n
,
y∗k =
{
αk , k = 1, . . . , j − 1
−h−1k (ω) + αk , k = j, . . . , n
.
Proof: The proof of statement (i) consists of two steps. In the first step, we show that the optimization problem stated in
the lemma is convex; then we apply Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to said problem, and finally reformulate these
conditions into a reduced number of equations. The bulk of this proof comes later, in the second step, where we proceed to
solve the system of equations for the two cases considered in the lemma, ψ < ω and ψ = ω. Lastly, statements (ii) and (iii)
follow from (i).
To see that the problem is convex, simply observe that the objective function is convex on account of H(fk)  0, and that the
inequality and equality constraint functions are affine. Since the objective and constraint functions are also differentiable and
Slater’s constraint qualification holds, KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality [41]. Systematic
application of these optimality conditions leads to the Lagrangian cost,
L =
∑
fk(xk, yk) −
∑
λkxk −
∑
µkyk +
∑
νk(yk − κk − xk) − ψ
(∑
xk − η
)
+ ω
(∑
yk − θ
)
,
7and finally to the conditions
xk > 0, yk > 0, κk + xk − yk > 0,∑
xk = η,
∑
yk = θ, (primal feasibility)
λk > 0, µk > 0, νk > 0, (dual feasibility)
λk xk = 0, µk yk = 0,
νk (yk − κk − xk) = 0, (complementary slackness)
∂L
∂xk
= hk(xk, yk)− λk − νk − ψ = 0,
∂L
∂yk
= hk(xk, yk) + µk − νk − ω = 0. (dual optimality)
Because lim
xk↓yk−κk
hk(xk, yk) = −∞, it follows from the dual optimality conditions that κk + xk − yk > 0, which implies,
by complementary slackness, that νk = 0. Subsequently, we may rewrite the dual optimality conditions as λk = hk(xk, yk)−ψ
and µk = ω − hk(xk, yk). By eliminating the slack variables λk, µk, we obtain the simplified conditions hk(xk, yk) > ψ and
hk(xk, yk) 6 ω. Lastly, we substitute the above expressions of λk and µk into the complementary slackness conditions, so
that we can formulate the dual optimality and complementary slackness conditions equivalently as
hk(xk, yk) > ψ, (4)
hk(xk, yk) 6 ω, (5)
(hk(xk, yk)− ψ)xk = 0, (6)
(hk(xk, yk)− ω) yk = 0. (7)
In the following, we shall proceed to solve these equations which, together with the primal and dual feasibility conditions,
are necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. To this end, first note that, if ψ > ω, then there exists no (xk, yk) that
satisfies equations (4) and (5) at the same time, and consequently, as stated in part (i) of the lemma, there is no solution.
Concordantly, next we shall study the case when ψ < ω; afterwards we shall tackle the other case when ψ = ω.
Before plunging into the analysis of the former case, recall that the function hk is strictly increasing in xk and strictly
decreasing in yk. Having said this, observe that, under the assumption ψ < ω, the variables xk and yk cannot be positive
simultaneously by virtue of equations (6) and (7). Bearing this in mind, consider these three possibilities for each k: hk(0, 0) <
ψ, ψ 6 hk(0, 0) 6 ω and ω < hk(0, 0).
When hk(0, 0) < ψ, the only conclusion consistent with (4) and with the fact that hk is strictly increasing in xk is that
xk > 0. Since xk must be positive, the complementary slackness condition (6) implies that hk(xk, yk) = ψ and, because
of (7), that yk = 0. As a result, xk must satisfy hk(xk, 0) = ψ, or equivalently, xk = h−1k (ψ). Next, we show that the
solution (xk, 0) is unique. For this purpose, suppose that yk > 0 and, in consequence, that xk = 0. It follows from (7),
however, that hk(0, yk) = ω, which contradicts the fact that hk is a strictly decreasing function of yk. In the end, we verify
that xk = yk = 0 does not satisfy (4) and thus prove that (xk, yk) = (h−1k (ψ), 0) is the unique minimizer of the objective
function when hk(0, 0) < ψ.
Now consider the case when ψ 6 hk(0, 0) 6 ω. First, suppose that xk > 0, and therefore that yk = 0. By complementary
slackness, it follows that hk(xk, 0) = ψ, which is not consistent with the fact that hk is strictly increasing in xk. Consequently,
xk cannot be positive. Secondly, assume that xk is zero and yk positive. Under this assumption, equation (7) implies that
hk(0, yk) = ω, a contradiction since hk is a strictly decreasing function of yk. Accordingly, yk cannot be positive either.
Finally, check that xk = yk = 0 satisfies the optimality conditions and hence it is the unique solution.
The last possibility corresponds to the case when ω < hk(0, 0). Note that, in this case, the only conclusion consistent with (5)
and with the fact that hk is strictly decreasing in yk is that yk > 0. Thus, because of (7), yk must satisfy hk(0, yk) = ω.
Recalling from the lemma that hk(xk, yk) = hk(xk − yk, 0), we may express the condition hk(0, yk) = ω equivalently as
yk = −h−1k (ω). Lastly, we check that this solution is unique in the case under study. To this end, note that a solution such
that xk > 0 and yk = 0 contradicts the fact that hk is strictly increasing in xk. As a result, xk cannot be positive. Finally,
we confirm that equation (5) does not hold for xk = yk = 0 and therefore prove that (xk, yk) = (0,−h−1k (ω)) is the unique
solution when ω < hk(0, 0).
In summary, xk = h−1k (ψ) if hk(0, 0) < ψ, or equivalently, h
−1
k (ψ) > 0; otherwise xk = 0. Further, yk = −h−1k (ω) if
hk(0, 0) > ω, or equivalently, h−1k (ω) < 0; otherwise yk = 0. Accordingly, we may write the solution compactly as
(xk, yk) =
(
max
{
0, h−1k (ψ)
}
,max
{
0,−h−1k (ω)
})
,
where ψ, ω must satisfy the primal equality constraints
∑
k xk = η and
∑
k yk = θ.
Having examined the case when ψ < ω, next we proceed to solve the optimality conditions at hand for ψ = ω. Observe
that, in this new case, (4) and (5) transform into the equation
hk(xk, yk) = ψ. (8)
8Moreover, note that any pair (xk, yk) satisfying (8) also meets the complementary slackness conditions (6) and (7). However,
notice that this does not mean that all those pairs are optimal. To elaborate on this point, consider the following three possibilities
for each k: hk(0, 0) < ψ, hk(0, 0) = ψ and ψ < hk(0, 0).
In the case when hk(0, 0) < ψ, the only condition consistent with (8) and with the fact that hk is strictly increasing in xk is
that xk > 0. From the lemma, it is immediate that ∂hk∂xk = −∂hk∂yk , which implies that xk must also be greater than yk. Hence,
the set of solutions is
{(xk, yk) : hk(xk, yk) = ψ, xk > yk},
where every pair in this set must also fulfill the primal equality conditions. Let x′k satisfy hk(x
′
k, 0) = ψ, or equivalently,
x′k = h
−1
k (ψ). Then, because hk(x
′
k + αk, αk) = ψ for any α > 0, this set may be recast equivalently as
{(xk, yk) : xk = x′k + αk, yk = αk}.
For the two remaining cases, i.e., hk(0, 0) = ψ and ψ < hk(0, 0), the set of solutions is obtained in a completely analogous
way as above. In the former case, the pairs (xk, yk) must satisfy xk = yk, and the set of solutions may be expressed as
{(xk, yk) : xk = αk, yk = αk}.
In the latter case, it follows that yk > xk and, consequently, that the set of solutions is
{(xk, yk) : xk = αk, yk = y′k + αk},
where y′k must satisfy hk(0, y
′
k) = ψ.
To sum up, the case ψ = ω leads to the following solutions: xk = h−1k (ψ) + αk if hk(0, 0) < ψ, or equivalently,
h−1k (ψ) > 0; otherwise xk = αk. In addition, yk = −h−1k (ω) + αk if hk(0, 0) > ω, or equivalently, h−1k (ω) < 0; otherwise
yk = αk. Accordingly, the solutions (xk, yk) yield(
max
{
0, h−1k (ψ)
}
+ αk,max
{
0,−h−1k (ω)
}
+ αk
)
, (9)
for some ψ, ω and nonnegative sequence α1, . . . , αn such that
∑
k xk = η and
∑
k yk = θ. Note that, although ψ = ω, we
intentionally write ω instead of ψ to highlight that the solutions for ψ < ω and for ψ = ω just differ in the term αk, as we
claimed in part (i) of the lemma.
To complete the proof of statement (i), it suffices to show that the number of solutions is infinite when ψ = ω. To this end,
simply observe that there exists an infinite number of sequences α1, . . . , αn such that∑
k
xk =
∑
k
h−1k (ψ) +
∑
k
αk = η and
∑
k
yk = −
∑
k
h−1k (ψ) +
∑
k
αk = θ,
which results in an infinite number of solutions of the form given in (9).
Now we proceed to prove (ii), which is an immediate consequence of (i). For this purpose, observe that if ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) 6
· · · 6 hn(0, 0) holds for some i = 0, . . . , n − 1, then h−1i+1(ψ), . . . , h−1n (ψ) 6 0, and accordingly xi+1 = · · · = xn = 0.
Similarly, if h1(0, 0) 6 · · · 6 hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω is satisfied for some j = 2, . . . , n+ 1, then h−11 (ω), . . . , h−1j−1(ω) > 0, and thus
y1 = · · · = yj−1 = 0.
Note that the particular case when the index i ranges from 1 to j− 1 and the index j goes from 2 to n is the case described
in (ii) (a), which corresponds to η, θ > 0. Further, observe that the case assumed in (ii) (b), i.e., when j = n+ 1, implies that
θ = 0. Here, the index i starts at 1, therefore excluding η = 0, and ends at n, including the possibility that xi > 0 for all i.
In part (ii) (c), we consider i = 0, which is equivalent to the condition η = 0. In this case, the index j starts at 1, permitting
yj > 0 for all j, and ends at n, avoiding θ = 0. Finally, the case described in (ii) (d), namely when j = n+ 1 and i = 0, is
precisely the trivial case x = y = 0.
In order to verify statement (iii), we proceed analogously by noting that if ψ = hi+1(0, 0) = · · · = hj−1(0, 0) holds for
some i = 1, . . . , j − 2 and some j = 3, . . . , n, then h−1i+1(ψ) = · · · = h−1j−1(ψ) = 0, and consequently xk = yk = αk for
k = i+ 1, . . . , j − 1. 
The previous lemma presented the solution to a resource allocation problem that minimizes a rather general but convex
objective function, subject to affine constraints. Our next theorem, Theorem 3, applies the results of this lemma to the special
case of the objective function of problem (1). In doing so, we shall confirm the intuition that there must exist a set of ordered
pairs (ρ, σ) where the privacy risk vanishes and another set where it does not. We shall refer to the former set as the critical-
privacy region and formally define it as
C = {(ρ, σ) : R(ρ, σ) = 0}.
The latter set will be the complementary set C¯ and we shall refer to it as the noncritical-privacy region.
9Before proceeding with Theorem 3, first we shall introduce what we term forgery and suppression thresholds, two sequences
of rates that will play a fundamental role in the characterization of the solution to the minimization problem defining the
privacy-forgery-suppression function. Secondly, we shall investigate certain properties of these thresholds in Proposition 2.
And thereafter, we shall introduce some definitions that will facilitate the exposition of the aforementioned theorem.
Let Qi =
∑i
k=1 qk and Pi =
∑i
k=1 pk be the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to q and p. Denote by
Q¯i =
∑n
k=i qk and P¯i =
∑n
k=i pk the complementary cumulative distribution functions of q and p. Define the forgery
thresholds ρi as
ρi =

Pi
qi
pi
−Qi , i = 1, . . . , j − 1
Pj−1
P¯j
(Q¯j − σ)−Qj−1, i = j
∞ , i = j + 1
,
for j = 2, . . . , n. Additionally, define the suppression thresholds σj as
σj = Q¯j − P¯j qj
pj
for j = 1, . . . , n, and σ0 = 1. Observe that ρ1 = σn = 0 and that the forgery threshold ρj is a linear function of σ. We shall
refer to this latter threshold as the critical forgery-suppression threshold and denote it also by ρcrit(σ). The reason is that said
threshold will determine the boundary of the critical-privacy region, as we shall see later. The following result, Proposition 2,
characterizes the monotonicity of the forgery and the suppression thresholds.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of Thresholds):
(i) For j = 3, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . , j − 2, the forgery thresholds satisfy ρi 6 ρi+1, with equality if, and only if, qipi =
qi+1
pi+1
.
(ii) For j = 2, . . . , n, the suppression thresholds satisfy σj 6 σj−1, with equality if, and only if, qjpj =
qj−1
pj−1
.
(iii) Further, for any j = 2, . . . , n and any σ ∈ (σj , σj−1], the critical forgery-suppression threshold satisfies ρj(σ) > ρj−1,
with equality if, and only if, σ = σj−1.
Proof: The first statement can be shown from the definition of the forgery thresholds by routine algebraic manipulation and
under the labeling assumption (3). To this end, it is helpful to note that
Pi
qi+1
pi+1
−Qi = Pi+1 qi+1
pi+1
−Qi+1.
The second statement can be shown analogously, observing that
Q¯j − P¯j qj−1
pj−1
= Q¯j−1 − P¯j−1 qj−1
pj−1
.
For the last statement, use the definitions of the forgery and the suppression thresholds to note that the condition ρj(σ) > ρj−1
is equivalent to σ 6 σj−1. 
Prior to investigate a closed-form solution to the problem (1), we introduce some definitions for ease of presentation. For
i = 1, . . . , j − 1 and j = 2, . . . , n, define
q˜ =
(
Qi , qi+1 , . . . , qj−1 , Q¯j
)
,
r˜ =
(
ρ , 0 , . . . , 0 , 0
)
,
s˜ =
(
0 , 0 , . . . , 0 , σ
)
,
p˜ =
(
Pi , pi+1 , . . . , pj−1 , P¯j
)
,
where q˜ and p˜ are distributions in the probability simplex of j− i+1 dimensions, and r˜ and s˜ are tuples of the same dimension
that represent a forgery strategy and a suppression strategy, respectively. Particularly, note that the indexes i = 1 and j = n
lead to q˜ = q and p˜ = p.
Theorem 3: Let ∂C be the boundary of C , and cl C¯ the closure of C¯ .
(i) ∂C ⊂ C and
∂C = {(ρ, σ) : ρ = ρj(σ), σ ∈ [σj , σj−1], for j = 2, . . . , n}.
(ii) For any (ρ, σ) ∈ cl C¯ , either ρ ∈ [ρi, ρi+1] for i = 1 or ρ ∈ (ρi, ρi+1] for some i = 2, . . . , j−1, and either σ ∈ [σj , σj−1]
for j = n or σ ∈ (σj , σj−1] for some j = 2, . . . , n − 1. Then, for the corresponding indexes i, j, the optimal forgery
and suppression strategies are
r∗k =
{ pk
Pi
(Qi + ρ)− qk , k = 1, . . . , i
0 , k = i+ 1, . . . , n
,
s∗k =
{
0 , k = 1, . . . , j − 1
qk − pkP¯j (Q¯j − σ), k = j, . . . , n
,
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and the corresponding, minimum KL divergence yields the privacy-forgery-suppression function
R(ρ, σ) = D
(
q˜ + r˜ − s˜
1 + ρ− σ
∥∥∥∥ p˜) .
Proof: The proof is structured as follows. We begin by showing that the optimization problem (1) may be construed as a
particular case of that stated in Lemma 1. Accordingly, we apply this lemma, namely the cases (ii) and (iii), to obtain the
optimal forgery and suppression strategies. The application of the former case allows us to derive the solution for (ρ, σ) ∈ C¯ .
The latter case enables us, first, to confirm that this solution is also valid on ∂C¯ , and secondly, to prove statement (i). Lastly,
we complete the proof of (ii) by expressing function (1) in terms of the optimal apparent distribution.
Use the definition of KL divergence to write the objective function of the optimization problem as D(t ‖ p) = ∑k tk log tkpk ,
with t = q+r−s1+ρ−σ . Observe that the functions fk(rk, sk) = tk log
tk
pk
are twice differentiable on {(rk, sk) : qk + rk − sk > 0}.
Denote by hk the derivative of fk with respect to rk,
hk(rk, sk) =
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
qk + rk − sk
(1 + ρ− σ)pk + 1
)
. (10)
Then, note that the functions fk and hk satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 1, and that the inequality and equality constraints
of function (1) coincide with those in the lemma. This exposes the structure of the optimization problem as a special case of
the resource allocation lemma.
Before proceeding any further, notice from (10) that hk(rk, 0) is a strictly increasing function of rk and hence invertible.
Note also that, according to the lemma, the solutions are completely determined by the inverse of this function, which is
denoted by h−1k and yields
h−1k (φ) = pk(1 + ρ− σ)2(1+ρ−σ)φ−1 − qk.
Finally, observe that the assumption h1(0, 0) 6 · · · 6 hn(0, 0) in the lemma is equivalent to the labeling assumption (3), as
hk(0, 0) is a strictly increasing function of qkpk .
Next we apply Lemma 1 (ii), where it is assumed the condition ψ < ω. We start with case (ii) (a). On account of part (i)
of the lemma, the optimal forgery strategy must satisfy
ρ =
i∑
k=1
h−1k (ψ) = Pi(1 + ρ− σ)2(1+ρ−σ)ψ−1 −Qi,
or equivalently,
ψ =
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
Qi + ρ
(1 + ρ− σ)Pi + 1
)
.
Analogously for the suppression strategy,
σ = −
n∑
k=j
h−1k (ω) = Q¯j − P¯j(1 + ρ− σ)2(1+ρ−σ)ω−1,
and therefore
ω =
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
Q¯j − σ
(1 + ρ− σ)P¯j + 1
)
.
Then it suffices to substitute the expressions of ψ and ω into the function h−1k , to obtain the nonzero optimal solutions claimed
in assertion (ii) of the theorem.
Now we proceed to confirm the interval of values of ρ and σ where these solutions are defined. In the case under study, ψ
and ω satisfy hi(0, 0) < ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) for some i = 1, . . . , j − 1 and hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω < hj(0, 0) for some j = 2, . . . , n. We
split the discussion into two cases, namely i < j − 1 and i = j − 1.
Assume the former case. Observe that the condition hi(0, 0) < ψ is equivalent to
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
qi
(1 + ρ− σ)pi + 1
)
<
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
Qi + ρ
(1 + ρ− σ)Pi + 1
)
and finally, after routine algebraic manipulation, to
ρ > Pi
qi
pi
−Qi.
Similarly, the upper-bound condition ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) leads to
ρ 6 Pi
qi+1
pi+1
−Qi.
11
Hence, the intervals resulting from imposing hi(0, 0) < ψ 6 hi+1(0, 0) are of the form (ρi, ρi+1]. The monotonicity of the
thresholds ρi, demonstrated in Proposition 2, guarantees that these intervals are contiguous and nonoverlapping. In an analogous
manner, it can be shown that the condition hj−1(0, 0) 6 ω < hj(0, 0) leads to intervals of the form (σj , σj−1], also contiguous
and nonoverlapping by virtue of Proposition 2.
Now assume the latter case, where hi(0, 0) < ψ < ω < hj(0, 0) with i = j − 1. On the one hand, the assumption
hj−1(0, 0) < ψ is, as shown above, equivalent to the condition ρ > ρj−1. On the other hand, straightforward manipulation
allows us to write the inequality ψ < ω as
ρ <
Pj−1
P¯j
(Q¯j − σ)−Qj−1.
Combining these two bounds on ψ, we obtain the interval (ρj−1, ρcrit(σ)). With this last interval, we complete the range of
validity of the solution for the case (ii) (a) in the lemma. Ultimately, it is easy to verify that, in those intervals of ρ and σ, the
optimal apparent profile t = q+r−s1+ρ−σ does not coincide with the population’s profile p. In consequence, D(t ‖ p) > 0.
Next, we turn to case (ii) (b) of the lemma. Here, the assumption hn(0, 0) 6 ω leads to σ = 0, or equivalently, to the solution
s = 0. Note that, precisely, this is the solution given in the theorem for σ = σj with j = n. On the other hand, the application
of the condition
∑i
k=1 rk = ρ results in the same optimal forgery strategy obtained in case (ii) (a). Proceeding analogously
as in this case, from the assumptions on ψ we derive the intervals of values of ρ where the solution is defined: (ρi, ρi+1] for
i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and (ρi, ρi+1) for i = n. Given these intervals, it is then straightforward to check that R(ρ, 0) = 0 if, and
only if, ρ > ρn. This provides us with the pairs (ρ, 0) that belong to cl C¯ .
In case (ii) (c), the condition ψ 6 h1(0, 0) means that ρ = 0, or equivalently, r = 0. Observe that this is the solution
stated in the theorem for ρ = ρi with i = 1. Then again, the condition
∑n
k=j sk = σ leads to the same optimal suppression
strategy found in case (ii) (a). From the assumptions in the lemma on ω, we obtain the intervals (σj , σj−1] for j = 2, . . . , n
and (σj , σj−1) for j = 1. Then, we verify that R(0, σ) = 0 if, and only if, σ > σ1, from which it follows the pairs (0, σ) that
belong to cl C¯ .
Finally, the case (ii) (d) in the lemma, in which hn(0, 0) 6 ω and ψ 6 h1(0, 0), corresponds to the trivial case σ = σj for
j = n and ρ = ρi for i = 1, that is, the solution r = s = 0.
After having applied Lemma 1 (ii) to function (1), now we proceed with case (iii) (a). In applying it, we shall show that
the solution claimed in the theorem is also valid for the extreme values of the intervals in case (ii) (a), specifically the set
{(ρ, σ) : ρ = ρcrit(σ), σ ∈ (σj , σj−1] for j = 3, . . . , n, and σ ∈ (σj , σj−1) for j = 2}.
Assume the case (iii) (a) in which hi(0, 0) < ψ = ω < hj(0, 0) for some j = 2, . . . , n and i = j−1. Under this assumption,
the equality constraint
∑i
k=1 rk = ρ in the lemma is equivalent, after simple algebraic manipulation, to
ψ =
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
Qj−1 + ρ− ζ
(1 + ρ− σ)Pj−1 + 1
)
, (11)
where we define ζ =
∑n
k=1 αk. Similarly, the equality constraint
∑n
k=j sk = σ becomes
ω =
1
1 + ρ− σ
(
log
Q¯j − σ + ζ
(1 + ρ− σ)P¯j + 1
)
.
But ψ = ω, therefore
Qj−1 + ρ− ζ
Pj−1
=
Q¯j − σ + ζ
P¯j
,
or equivalently,
ρ = ρcrit(σ) +
ζ
P¯j
.
In short, the assumption ψ = ω imposes the condition (ρ, σ)  (ρcrit(σ), σ) for some nonnegative sequence α1, . . . , αn
satisfying the above equality. Next we examine, for a given σ, these two possibilities, ρ = ρcrit(σ) and ρ > ρcrit(σ).
Consider the former possibility and observe that ρ = ρcrit(σ) if, and only if, αk = 0 for k = 1, . . . , n. According to the
lemma, the nonzero optimal solutions yield
rk = h
−1
k (ψ) = pk
Qj−1 + ρcrit(σ)
Pj−1
− qk
= pk(1 + ρcrit(σ)− σ)− qk
for k = 1, . . . , j − 1, and
sk = −h−1k (ψ) = qk − pk(1 + ρcrit(σ)− σ)
for k = j, . . . , n, that is, the solutions obtained after applying case (ii) (a), but evaluated at ρ = ρcrit(σ). From these expression
for r and s, it is immediate to verify then that t = p and thus R(ρ, σ) = 0.
12
population’s profile p
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Fig. 2: A user’s item distribution is perturbed according to two optimal forgery and suppression strategies, in order for the resulting profile to minimize the
KL divergence with respect to the population’s distribution.
Now we assume the latter possibility, i.e., (ρ, σ)  (ρcrit(σ), σ), to show that the privacy-risk function also vanishes for
these values of ρ and σ. On account of part (iii) (a) of the lemma and (11), we derive the optimal forgery and suppression
strategies
rk = pk(1 + ρcrit(σ)− σ) + pk ζ
P¯j
− qk + αk
and sk = αk for k = 1, . . . , j − 1, and
sk = qk − pk(1 + ρcrit(σ)− σ)− pk ζ
P¯j
+ αk
and rk = αk for k = j, . . . , n. Then, we substitute r and s back into the apparent profile t and check that D(t ‖ p) = 0. In
doing so, we determine the pairs (ρ, σ)  0 that belong to cl C¯ , and finally obtain the expression for the boundary of the
critical-privacy region claimed in statement (i) of the theorem.
To conclude the proof, it remains only to write the privacy-risk function R(ρ, σ) = ∑nk=1 tk log tkpk in terms of the optimal
apparent distribution. With this aim, we split the summation into three parts. The first part, corresponding to tk =
pk(Qi+ρ)
Pi(1+ρ−σ) ,
is
i∑
k=1
tk log
tk
pk
=
Qi + ρ
1 + ρ− σ log
Qi + ρ
(1 + ρ− σ)Pi ,
where we leverage on the fact that tkpk does not depend on k. The second part of the sum, corresponding to tk =
qk
1+ρ−σ , yields
j−1∑
k=i+1
tk log
tk
pk
=
j−1∑
k=i+1
qk
1 + ρ− σ log
qk
(1 + ρ− σ)pk .
The last part, corresponding to tk =
pk(Q¯j−σ)
P¯j(1+ρ−σ) , is
n∑
k=j
tk log
tk
pk
=
Q¯j − σ
1 + ρ− σ log
Q¯j − σ
(1 + ρ− σ)P¯j ,
where we also note that tkpk does not depend on k either. Now, it is straightforward to identify the terms of R(ρ, σ) as the KL
divergence between the distributions(
Qi + ρ
1 + ρ− σ ,
qi+1
1 + ρ− σ , . . . ,
qj−1
1 + ρ− σ ,
Q¯j − σ
1 + ρ− σ
)
and (
Pi, pi+1, . . . , pj−1, P¯j
)
,
precisely the distributions stated in the theorem. 
In light of Theorem 3, we would like to remark the intuitive principle that both the optimal forgery and suppression strategies
follow. On the one hand, the forgery strategy suggests adding ratings to those categories with a low ratio qkpk , that is, to those in
which the user’s interest is considerably lower than the population’s. On the other hand, the suppression strategy recommends
eliminating ratings from those categories where the ratio qkpk is high, i.e., where the interest of the user exceeds that of the
population.
Another straightforward consequence of Theorem 3 is the role of the forgery and the suppression thresholds. In particular,
we identify ρi as the forgery rate beyond which the components of rk for k = 1, . . . , i become positive. A similar reasoning
applies to σj , which indicates the suppression rate beyond which the components of sk for k = j, . . . , n are positive. In a
nutshell, these thresholds determine the number of nonzero components of the optimal strategies.
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Also, from this theorem we deduce that the perturbation of the user profile does not only affect those categories where
either rk > 0 or sk > 0. In fact, since we are dealing with relative frequencies, the components of the apparent distribution tk
belonging to the categories k = i+ 1, . . . , j − 1 are normalized by 11+ρ−σ . Fig. 2 illustrates these three conclusions by means
of a simple example with n = 5 categories of interest.
In this example we consider a user who is disposed to submit a percentage of false ratings ρ ∈ (ρ2, ρ3], and to refrain
from sending a fraction of genuine ratings σ ∈ (σ4, σ3]. Given these rates, the optimal forgery strategy recommends that the
user forge ratings belonging to the categories 1 and 2, where clearly there is a lack of interest, compared to the reference
distribution. On the contrary, the suppression strategy specifies that the user eliminate ratings from the categories 4 and 5, that
is, from those categories where they show too much interest, again compared to the population’s profile. In adopting these two
strategies, the apparent user profile approaches the population’s distribution, especially in those components where the ratio qkpk
deviates significantly from 1. Finally, the component of the apparent profile t3, which is not directly affected by the forgery
and the suppression strategies, gets closer to p3 as a result of the aforementioned normalization.
In the following subsections, we shall analyze a number of important consequences of Theorem 3.
B. Orthogonality, Continuity and Proportionality
In this subsection we study some interesting properties of the closed-form solution obtained in Sec. IV-A. Specifically, we
investigate the orthogonality and continuity of the optimal forgery and suppression strategies, and then establish a proportionality
relationship between the optimal apparent user profile and the population’s distribution.
Corollary 4 (Orthogonality and Continuity):
(i) For any (ρ, σ) ∈ cl C¯ , the optimal forgery and suppression strategies satisfy r∗k s∗k = 0 for k = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) The components of r∗ and s∗, interpreted as functions of ρ and σ respectively, are continuous on cl C¯ .
Proof: The proof of (i) is trivial from Theorem 3. To prove statement (ii) we also resort to this theorem. According to it,
each component r∗k may be regarded as a piecewise function of ρ defined on the contiguous, nonoverlapping intervals [ρi, ρi+1]
for i = 1 and (ρi, ρi+1] for i = 2, . . . , j − 1. A direct verification shows that, for any k = j, . . . , n, the component r∗k is
identically zero on the whole interval [ρ1, ρj ] and hence continuous. For any k = 1, . . . , j − 1, we immediately check the
continuity of r∗k on the interior of each of the intervals parameterized by i. Now we examine the endpoints of such intervals.
The continuity at the extreme points ρ1 and ρj is verified straightforwardly as the intervals are closed at these points. Then,
we check that the limit at the remaining endpoints ρi exists, since
lim
ρ→ρ−i
r∗k(ρ) =
pk
Pi−1
(Qi−1 + ρi)− qk
=
pk
Pi
(Qi + ρi)− qk = lim
ρ→ρ+i
r∗k(ρ),
for i = 2, . . . , j − 1. Because each limit coincides with the corresponding value r∗k(ρi), we prove the continuity of the
components r1, . . . , rj−1. The proof of the continuity of the components of s∗ is analogous to that of r∗. 
The orthogonality of the optimal forgery and suppression strategies, in the sense indicated by Corollary 4 (i), conforms to
intuition—it would not make any sense to submit false ratings to items of a particular category and, at the same time, eliminate
genuine ratings from this category. This intuitive result is illustrated in Fig. 2. The second part of Corollary 4 is applied to
show our next result, Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (Proportionality): Define the piecewise functions φ(ρ, σ) = Qi+ρ(1+ρ−σ)Pi and χ(ρ, σ) =
Q¯j−σ
(1+ρ−σ)P¯j on the
intervals [σj , σj−1] for j = 2, . . . , n and [ρi, ρi+1] for i = 1, . . . , j − 1.
(i) For any j = 2, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . , j − 1, and for any σ ∈ [σj , σj−1] and ρ ∈ [ρi, ρi+1], the optimal apparent profile
t∗ and the population’s distribution p satisfy
t∗1
p1
= · · · = t
∗
i
pi
= φ(ρ, σ),
t∗j
pj
= · · · = t
∗
n
pn
= χ(ρ, σ),
and
φ(ρ, σ) 6
t∗i+1
pi+1
6 · · · 6 t
∗
j−1
pj−1
6 χ(ρ, σ).
(ii) The function φ is continuous and strictly increasing in each of its arguments, and satisfies φ(ρ, σ) 6 1, with equality if,
and only if, (ρ, σ) = (ρj(σ), σ).
(iii) The function χ is continuous and strictly decreasing in each of its arguments, and satisfies χ(ρ, σ) > 1, with equality
if, and only if, (ρ, σ) = (ρj(σ), σ).
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Fig. 3: Proportionality relationship between the optimal user’s apparent item distribution and the population’s profile. In this figure we show the ratios t
∗
k
pk
of
the example illustrated in Fig. 2, where the number of categories is n = 5, ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ3] and σ ∈ [σ4, σ3].
Proof: The continuity of the components of t∗ on cl C¯ follows from Corollary 4 (ii). This allows us to write the intervals in
Theorem 3 as [ρi, ρi+1] and [σj , σj−1], in lieu of (ρi, ρi+1] and (σj , σj−1], respectively. From the expressions of r∗k and s
∗
k in
the theorem, it is immediate to identify the ratios t
∗
k
pk
as either φ(ρ, σ) or χ(ρ, σ). The inner inequalities in statement (i) of this
proposition also follow immediately from the labeling assumption (3). Direct manipulation shows that the outer inequalities
t∗i
pi
6 t
∗
i+1
pi+1
and
t∗j−1
pj−1
6 t
∗
j
pj
are equivalent to ρ 6 ρi+1 and σ 6 σj−1, respectively. This proves (i).
Next, we proceed to demonstrate the strict monotonicity of φ. A simple calculation shows that
∂φ
∂ρ
=
Q¯i+1 − σ
(1 + ρ− σ)2Pi .
To prove that ∂φ∂ρ > 0, it is sufficient to verify that Q¯j > σj−1, or equivalently, that P¯j
qj−1
pj−1
> 0. Then, by the positivity
assumption (2), we immediately see that this latter inequality holds for any j = 2, . . . , n. The strict monotonicity of φ in σ
also follows from assumption (2).
To complete (ii), we write the condition φ(ρ, σ) 6 1 as
ρ 6 (1− σ)Pi −Qi
P¯i+1
.
A routine computation shows that the equality holds for ρj(σ) and any σ ∈ [σj , σj−1] with j = 2, . . . , n. Therefore, for
any fixed σ, the inequality holds strictly for any other ρ. The converse, that is, φ(ρ, σ) = 1 implies (ρ, σ) = (ρj(σ), σ), is
immediate from the strict monotonicity of φ. The proof of statement (iii) proceeds along the same lines of that of (ii) and is
omitted. 
Our previous result tells us how perturbation operates. According to Proposition 5, the optimal strategies perturb the user
profile in such a manner that, in those categories with the lowest and highest ratios qkpk , the apparent profile becomes proportional
to the population’s distribution. More precisely, the common ratio t
∗
k
pk
increases with both ρ and σ in those categories affected
by forgery, that is, k = 1, . . . , i. Exactly the opposite happens in those categories affected by suppression, where the common
ratio
t∗j
pj
decreases with both rates. This tendency continues until ρ = ρcrit(σ), at which point t∗ = p. Fig. 3 illustrates this
proportionality property in the case of the example depicted in Fig. 2.
C. Critical-Privacy Region
One of the results of Theorem 3 is that the boundary of the critical-privacy region is determined by the critical forgery-
suppression threshold ρj(σ), which we also denote by ρcrit(σ) to highlight this fact. The following proposition leverages on
this result and characterizes said region. In particular, Proposition 6 first examines some properties of this threshold and then
investigates the convexity of the critical-privacy region.
Proposition 6 (Convexity of the Critical-Privacy Region):
(i) ρj is a convex, piecewise linear function of σ ∈ [σj , σj−1] for j = 2, . . . , n.
(ii) C is convex.
Proof: From Theorem 3, it is routine to check the continuity of ρj on [σn, σ1]. To show its convexity, we conveniently
write this function as ρj(σ) = mj σ + bj , where mj = −Pj−1P¯j and bj =
Pj−1−Qj−1
P¯j
. Next, we prove that the slopes satisfy
mj < mj−1 for all j = 3, . . . , n. We proceed by contradiction, assuming that mj > mj−1. Note that this inequality is equivalent
to Pj−1P¯j−1 6 P¯j − P¯jP¯j−1 and, after algebraic simplification, to pj−1 6 0. This contradicts the positivity assumption (2),
which, in turn, implies that mj < 0 for all j = 2, . . . , n. Therefore, since ρj is a piecewise linear function defined by the
strictly increasing sequence of negative slopes {mn, . . . ,m2}, we can conclude that ρj is convex. This proves statement (i).
The second statement follows from the first one. As ρj is convex, so is its epigraph, i.e., the critical-privacy region. 
The conclusions drawn from Proposition 6 are illustrated in Fig. 4. In this figure we represent the critical and noncritical-
privacy regions for n = 5 categories of interest; the distributions q and p assumed in this conceptual example are different
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Fig. 4: Conceptual plot of the critical and noncritical privacy regions for n = 5 categories.
from those considered in Figs. 2 and 3. That said, the figure in question shows a straightforward consequence of our previous
proposition—the noncritical-privacy region is nonconvex.
In this illustrative example, the sequences of forgery thresholds {ρ1 . . . , ρ5} and suppression thresholds {σ5, . . . , σ1} are
strictly increasing. By Proposition 2, we can conclude then that the inequalities of the labeling assumption (3) hold strictly.
Related to these thresholds is also the number of nonzero components of the optimal strategies, as follows from Theorem 3.
Fig. 4 shows the sets of pairs (ρ, σ) where the number of nonzero components of r∗ and s∗ is fixed. Thus, in the triangular
area shown darker, corresponding to the Cartesian product of the intervals [ρ3, ρ4] and [σ4, σ3], the solutions r∗ and s∗ have
i = 3 and n− j + 1 = 2 nonzero components, respectively.
D. Case of Low Forgery and Suppression
This subsection characterizes the privacy-forgery-suppression function in the special case when ρ, σ ' 0.
Proposition 7 (Low Rates of Forgery and Suppression): Assume the nontrivial case in which q 6= p. Then, there exist two
indexes i, j such that 0 = ρ1 = · · · = ρi < ρi+1 and 0 = σn = · · · = σj < σj−1. For any ρ ∈ [0, ρi+1] and σ ∈ [0, σj−1], the
number of nonzero components of the optimal forgery and suppression strategies is i and n− j + 1, respectively. Further, the
gradient of the privacy-forgery-suppression function at the origin is
∇R(0, 0) =
 ∂R(0,0)∂ρ
∂R(0,0)
∂σ
 =
 log q1p1 −D(q ‖ p)
D(q ‖ p)− log qnpn
 .
Proof: The existence of the indexes i and j is guaranteed by the assumption that q 6= p. The number of nonzero components
of r∗ and s∗ is trivial from Theorem 3. In view of this theorem, for any ρ ∈ [0, ρi+1] and σ ∈ [0, σj−1], we have
R(ρ, σ) = D
(
q˜ + ρ(1, 0, . . . , 0)− σ(0, . . . , 0, 1)
1 + ρ− σ
∥∥∥∥ p˜) .
The continuity of the components of r∗ and s∗ proven in Corollary 4 (ii) ensures the continuity of the privacy-forgery-
suppression function on C¯ . It is routine to check its differentiability in this region and to obtain its derivative with respect to
σ at the origin,
∂R(0, 0)
∂σ
= Qi log
Qi P¯j
Pi Q¯j
+
j−1∑
k=i+1
qk log
P¯j qk
Q¯j pk
.
On account of Proposition 2, the conditions ρ1 = · · · = ρi and σj = · · · = σn imply
q1
p1
= · · · = qi
pi
=
Qi
Pi
and
qj
pj
= · · · = qn
pn
=
Q¯j
P¯j
.
Therefore,
∂R(0, 0)
∂σ
=
j−1∑
k=1
qk log
qk
pk
−Qj−1 log qn
pn
= D(q ‖ p)− log qn
pn
.
16
The derivative of R with respect to ρ at ρ = σ = 0 follows analogously. 
Next, we shall derive an expression for the relative decrement of the privacy-risk function at ρ, σ ' 0. To this end, define
the forgery relative decrement factor
δρ = −
∂R(0,0)
∂ρ
R(0, 0) = 1−
log q1p1
D(q ‖ p) ,
and the suppression relative decrement factor
δσ = −
∂R(0,0)
∂σ
R(0, 0) =
log qnpn
D(q ‖ p) − 1.
By dint of Proposition 7, the first-order Taylor approximation of function (1) around ρ = σ = 0 yields
R(ρ, σ) ' D(q ‖ p) + ρ
(
log
q1
p1
−D(q ‖ p)
)
+ σ
(
D(q ‖ p)− log qn
pn
)
,
or more compactly, in terms of the decrement factors,
D(q ‖ p)−R(ρ, σ)
D(q ‖ p) ' δρ ρ+ δσ σ.
In words, the minimum and maximum ratios qkpk characterize the relative reduction in privacy risk. The following result,
Proposition 8, establishes a bound on these relative decrement factors.
Proposition 8 (Relative Decrement Factors): In the nontrivial case when q 6= p, the relative decrement factors satisfy δρ > 1
and δσ > 0.
Proof: Observe that the statement δρ > 1 is equivalent to the condition q1 < p1. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose
that q1 > p1. By the labeling assumption (3), it follows that qk > pk for all k, what leads to the contradiction that 1 =
∑
qk >∑
pk = 1. Now assume that q1 = p1. Since q 6= p, there must exist an index i such that
q1
p1
= · · · = qi−1
pi−1
<
qi
pi
6 · · · 6 qn
pn
.
But this implies that
1−
i−1∑
k=1
qk =
n∑
k=i
qk >
n∑
k=i
pk = 1−
i−1∑
k=1
qk,
a contradiction. This proves the first part of the proposition.
For the second part, note that the statement δσ > 0 is equivalent to
q1 log
q1
p1
+ · · ·+ qn log qn
pn
< log
qn
pn
,
and, after algebraic manipulation, to
q1 log
q1
p1
pn
qn
+ · · ·+ qn−1 log qn−1
pn−1
pn
qn
< 0.
The positivity and labeling assumptions (2), (3) ensure that all terms in the sum are nonpositive. However, the additional
assumption q 6= p implies that q1p1 <
qn
pn
, which in turn implies that the first term is negative and so is, consequently, the entire
summation. 
Conceptually, the bound on δρ tells us that the relative decrement in privacy risk is greater than the forgery rate introduced.
This is under the assumption that q 6= p and at low rates of forgery and suppression. The bound on δσ , however, is looser than
the previous one and just ensures that an increase in the suppression rate always leads to a decrease in privacy risk, as one
would expect.
E. Pure Strategies
In the previous subsections we investigated the forgery and the suppression of ratings as a mixed strategy that users may
adopt to enhance their privacy. In this subsection we contemplate the case in which users may be reluctant to use these two
mechanisms in conjunction; and as a consequence, they may opt for a pure strategy consisting in the application of either
forgery or suppression. In this case, it would be useful to determine which is the most appropriate technique in terms of the
privacy-utility trade-off posed. Our next result, Corollary 9, provides some insight on this, under the assumption that, from the
user’s perspective, the impact on utility due to forgery is equivalent to that caused by the effect of suppression.
Before showing this result, observe from Theorem 3 that ρn = qnpn − 1 is the minimum forgery rate such that R(ρ, 0) = 0.
Analogously, σ1 = 1− q1p1 is the minimum suppression rate satisfying R(0, σ) = 0. In other words, ρn and σ1 are the critical
rates of the pure forgery and suppression strategies, respectively. Further, note that σ1 < σ0 = 1, on account of the positivity
assumption (2). However, ρn > 1 if, and only if, qnpn > 2.
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Fig. 5: Contour lines of the privacy-forgery-suppression function, the corresponding forgery and suppression thresholds, and the critical and noncritical privacy
regions.
Corollary 9 (Pure Strategies): Consider the nontrivial case when q 6= p.
(i) The critical rates of the pure forgery and suppression strategies satisfy ρn < σ1 if, and only if,
q1/p1 + qn/pn
2
< 1.
(ii) The forgery and the suppression relative decrement factors satisfy δρ > δσ if, and only if,√
q1
p1
qn
pn
< 2D(q ‖ p).
Proof: Both statements are immediate from the definitions of ρn and σ1 on the one hand, and δρ and δσ on the other. 
In conceptual terms, the condition ρn < σ1 means that the pure forgery strategy is the most appropriate mechanism in terms
of causing the minimum distortion to attain the critical-privacy region. On the other hand, the condition δρ > δσ implies that,
at low rates, the pure forgery strategy offers better privacy protection than the pure suppression strategy does. Therefore, the
conclusion that follows from Corollary 9 is that, together with the quantity D(q ‖ p), the arithmetic and geometric mean of the
ratios q1p1 and
qn
pn
determine which strategy to choose.
Another interesting remark is the duality of these two ratios q1p1 and
qn
pn
. The former characterizes the minimum rate for the
pure suppression strategy to reach the critical-privacy region and, at the same time, it establishes the privacy gain at low forgery
rates. Conversely, the latter ratio defines the critical rate of the pure forgery strategy and determines the relative decrement in
privacy risk at low suppression rates.
Lastly, we would like to establish a connection between our work and that of [11], [20], where the pure forgery and
suppression strategies are investigated. Denote by RF the function derived in [11] modeling the trade-off between forgery rate
and privacy risk, the latter being measured as the KL divergence between the user’s apparent profile and the population’s
distribution. Define ρ′ as the ratio of forged ratings to total number of ratings. Accordingly, it can be shown that ρ′ = ρ1+ρ and
that R(ρ, 0) = RF(ρ′). On the other hand, denote by PS the function in [20] characterizing the trade-off between suppression
rate and privacy gain. In this case, privacy is measured as the Shannon’s entropy of the user’s apparent profile. Under the
assumption that the population’s profile is uniform, it can be proven that R(0, σ) = log n− PS(σ). In short, our formulation
of the problem of optimal forgery and suppression of ratings encompasses, as particular cases, the cited works.
F. Numerical Example
This subsection presents a numerical example that illustrates the theoretical analysis conducted in the previous subsections.
Later on in Sec. V we shall evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in a real scenario, namely in the movie recommendation
system Movielens. In our numerical example we assume n = 3 categories of interests. Although the example shown here
is synthetic, these three categories could very well represent interests across topics such as technology, sports and beauty.
Accordingly, we suppose that the user’s rating distribution is
q = (0.130, 0.440, 0.430),
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(a) ρ = 0.050, σ = 0.100, ρ/ρcrit(σ) '
0.093, R(ρ, σ) ' 0.131, R(ρ, σ)/R0 ' 0.498,
r∗ = (0.050, 0, 0), s∗ = (0, 0, 0.100), t∗ '
(0.189, 0.463, 0.347).
q
t∗p
(100) (010)
(001)
(b) ρ = 0.100, σ = 0.200, ρ/ρcrit(σ) '
0.356, R(ρ, σ) ' 0.050, R(ρ, σ)/R0 ' 0.190,
r∗ = (0.100, 0, 0), s∗ ' (0, 0.019, 0.181), t∗ '
(0.256, 0.468, 0.276).
q
t∗ p
(100) (010)
(001)
(c) ρ ' 0.219, σ = 0.300, ρ/ρcrit(σ) = 1,
R(ρ, σ) = 0, R(ρ, σ)/R0 = 0, r∗ ' (0.219, 0, 0),
s∗ ' (0, 0.081, 0.219), t∗ = p.
q
t∗ p
(100) (010)
(001)
(d) ρ = 0.300, σ = 0.300, ρ/ρcrit(σ) '
1.368, R(ρ, σ) = 0, R(ρ, σ)/R0 = 0, r∗ '
(0.260, 0.021, 0.019), s∗ = (0.010, 0.071, 0.219),
t∗ = p.
Fig. 6: Probability simplices showing, for several interesting values of ρ and σ, the user’s actual profile q = (0.130, 0.440, 0.430), the population’s distribution
p = (0.380, 0.390, 0.230), the optimal apparent distribution t∗ and the set of feasible apparent distributions.
and the population’s,
p = (0.380, 0.390, 0.230).
Note that these distributions satisfy the positivity and labeling assumptions (2), (3).
From Sec. IV-A, we easily obtain the forgery thresholds ρ1 = 0, ρ2 ' 0.299 and ρ3 ' 0.870 on the one hand, and on the
other the suppression thresholds σ3 = 0, σ2 ' 0.171 and σ1 ' 0.658. The thresholds ρ3 and σ1 are the critical rates of the pure
strategies. If we are to reach the critical-privacy region and do not have any preference for either forgery or suppression, the
fact that ρ3 > σ1 leads us to opt for suppression as pure strategy. However, the geometric mean of q1p1 and
q3
p3
is approximately
0.799, which is lower than 2D(q ‖ p) ' 1.20. On account of Corollary 9, this means that the pure forgery strategy contributes to
a greater reduction in privacy risk at low rates than suppression does. In fact, the gradient of the privacy-forgery-suppression
function at the origin is ∇R(0, 0)T ' (−1.81,−0.639), by virtue of Proposition 7.
Fig. 5 shows the contour lines of this function, computed analytically from Theorem 3 and numerically (b). The region
plotted in gray shades corresponds to the noncritical-privacy region C¯ . The initial privacy risk is R(0, 0) ' 0.263. The white
area represents the critical-privacy region C , where the apparent user profile coincides with the population’s distribution and
thus the privacy risk vanishes. An interesting observation arising from Fig. 5 is the synergistic effect of combining forgery and
suppression. Just as an example, in the case when ρ = ρ2 and σ = σ2, the sum of these two distortion measures is lower than
the critical rates of the pure strategies.
Next, we examine the optimal apparent rating distribution for different values of ρ and σ. For this purpose, the user’s genuine
distribution q, the population’s distribution p and the optimal apparent distribution t∗ are depicted in the probability simplices
shown in Fig. 6. In each simplex, we also represent the contour lines of the KL divergence D(· ‖ p) between every distribution
in the simplex and p. Further, we plot the set of feasible apparent user distributions, not necessarily optimal, for four different
combinations of ρ and σ; in any of these cases, the set takes the form of a hexagon. Having said this, now we turn our attention
to Fig. 6(a). In this case, the optimal forgery and suppression strategies have i = n − j + 1 = 1 nonzero component, since
ρ ∈ [0, ρ2] and σ ∈ [0, σ2]. This places the solution t∗ at one vertex of the hexagon. A remarkable fact is that, for these rates,
(b)The numerical method chosen is the interior-point algorithm [41] implemented by the Matlab R2012b function fmincon.
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TABLE I: Category index of the particular user examined in our experiments. The categories of Movielens have been sorted and indexed in order to satisfy
the labeling assumption (3).
Index Category name Index Category name Index Category name
1 animation 7 sci-fi 13 war
2 action 8 comedy 14 mystery
3 film-noir 9 thriller 15 musical
4 children’s 10 fantasy 16 romance
5 adventure 11 horror 17 IMAX
6 crime 12 western 18 drama
19 documentary
the privacy risk is approximately halved. In the end, consistently with Proposition 8, the forgery and the suppression relative
decrement factors are δρ ' 6.87 > 1 and δσ ' 2.42 > 0.
In the case shown in Fig. 6(b), r∗ still has i = 1 nonzero components, while s∗ contains n− j+1 = 2 nonzero components.
Geometrically, the optimal apparent distribution lies at one edge of the feasible region. This lowers privacy risk to a 19% of
its initial value. The case in which (ρ, σ) = (ρcrit(σ), σ) is depicted in Fig. 6(c). Here, the number of nonzero components of
r∗ and s∗ remains the same as in the previous case, but the privacy risk becomes zero. The last case, illustrated in Fig. 6(d),
does not have any practical application, as R(ρ, σ) = 0 for any (ρ, σ) ∈ ∂C . In this figure we can observe that the solution t∗
is placed in the interior of the hexagon, and that the orthogonality principle of the strategies r∗ and s∗ stated in Corollary 4
is not satisfied.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the extent to which the forgery and the suppression of ratings could enhance user privacy in a
real-world recommendation system. The system chosen to conduct this evaluation is Movielens, a popular movie recommender
developed by the GroupLens Research Lab [42] at the University of Minnesota. As many other recommenders, Movielens allows
users to both rate and tag movies according to their preferences. These preferences are then exploited by the recommender to
suggest movies that users have not watched yet.
A. Data set
The data set that we used to assess our data-perturbative mechanism is the Movielens 10M data set [43], which contains
10 000 054 ratings and 95 580 tags. The ratings and tags included in this data set were assigned to 10 681 movies by 71 567
users. The data are organized in the form of quadruples (username, movie, rating, time), each one representing the action of
a user rating a movie at a certain time. Usernames have been replaced with numbers in an attempt to anonymize the data set.
For our purposes of experimentation, we just needed the data fields username and movie, together with the categories each
movie belongs to. Movielens contemplates n = 19 categories or movies genres, listed in alphabetical order as follows: action,
adventure, animation, children’s, comedy, crime, documentary, drama, fantasy, film-noir, horror, IMAX, musical, mystery,
romance, sci-fi, thriller, war and western. As we shall see later in Sec. V-B, for each particular user, we shall have to rearrange
those categories in such a way that the labeling assumption (3) is satisfied.
In our data set, all users rated, at least, 20 movies. This was the minimum number of ratings for the recommender to start
working (c). After the elimination of those users who exclusively tagged movies, the total number of users reduced to 69 878.
Despite the large number of users, we found that only 4 099 satisfied the positivity assumption (2). Considering that this small
group of users represents just the 5.8% of the total number of users, we can assume that the application of our technique will
have a negligible effect on the population’s profile p, as supposed in Sec. III-D.
B. Results
In this subsection we examine how the forgery and the suppression of ratings may help users of Movielens to enhance their
privacy. With this aim, first, we analyze the effect of the perturbation of ratings on the privacy protection of a particular user
from our data set. Secondly, we consider the entire set of 4 099 users and assess the relative reduction in privacy risk when
these users apply the same forgery and suppression rates. Lastly, we investigate the forgery and the suppression strategies
separately, and draw some conclusions about these two pure strategies.
To conduct our first experiments, we choose a particular user from our data set (d). Before perturbing the movie rating history
of this user, it is necessary that the components of the user’s profile q and the population’s distribution p be rearranged to
satisfy the labeling assumption (3). Table I shows how movie categories have been sorted, and then indexed from 1 to n, to
fulfill the assumption above. We would like to note that the index provided in this table does not have to coincide with the
index of other users in our data set.
(c)Nowadays, the algorithm implemented by Movielens requires only 15 ratings to start generating predictions.
(d)The user considered in this first series of experiments is identified by the number 3301 in [43].
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Fig. 7: In this figure we represent (a) the item distribution q of a particular user as well as the population’s item distribution p. In addition, we plot (b)
the optimal forgery strategy r∗ and (c) the optimal suppression strategy s∗ that the user in question should adopt when they specify σ = 0.150 and
ρ = ρcrit(σ) ' 0.180.
Fig. 7(a) depicts the user profile and the population profile, the latter being computed by averaging across the 69 878 users.
From this figure we note that the user’s interest far exceeds the population’s in categories such as musical, romance, IMAX,
drama and documentary. More precisely, such ratios qkpk yield(
qk
pk
)
k=15,...,19
' (1.300, 1.306, 1.451, 1.728, 2.292).
In this figure, we also observe that the user’s interest and the population’s in the category 17 are nearly zero, namely q17 '
0.0005 and p17 ' 0.0003.
On the other hand, Fig. 7(a) indicates that the user shows little interest, compared to the population’s preferences, in categories
such as animation, action, film-noir or children’s, to name just a few. Specifically, the first six smallest ratios qkpk yield(
qk
pk
)
k=1,...,6
' (0.444, 0.599, 0.651, 0.691, 0.705, 0.714).
Figs. 7(b) and 7(c) show the optimal forgery and suppression strategies that this particular user should apply, in the case when
σ = 0.150 and ρcrit(σ) ' 0.180. The solutions plotted in these figures are consistent with our two previous observations—the
optimal forgery strategy recommends that the user submit false ratings to movies falling into the categories where the ratio qkpk
is low; and the optimal suppression strategy suggests that the user refrain from rating movies belonging to categories where
the ratio qkpk is high. Just as an example, the fact that s
∗
17 ' 0.0001 means that the user at hand should eliminate one in five
ratings to movies classified as IMAX.
The optimal trade-off surface among privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate is represented in Fig. 8. In this figure we plot
the contour levels of the function R(ρ, σ), which we computed theoretically. The initial privacy risk is R(0, 0) ' 0.101 and
the arithmetic mean between the ratios q1p1 and
q19
p19
yields approximately 1.37. Since the mean is higher than 1, Corollary 9
tells us that the user should opt for suppression as pure strategy, in lieu of forgery. This is under the assumption that they wish
to achieve the minimum privacy risk and do not have any preference for any of the pure strategies. Nevertheless, the fact that
δρ ' 12.6 > δσ ' 10.9 leads us to choose forgery as pure strategy for ρ, σ ' 0. When both strategies are combined, note that
a forgery and suppression rate of just 0.1% leads to a relative reduction in privacy risk of 2.35%, on account of the first-order
Taylor approximation derived in Sec. IV-D.
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Fig. 8: Optimal trade-off surface among privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate for one particular user in our data set. The four points shown in this figure
correspond to the pairs of values (ρ, σ) that we used to show the proportionality relationship between t∗ and p in Fig. 9.
In Fig. 8 we have also plotted 4 points, which correspond to the following pairs of values (ρ, σ): (0.03, 0.04), (0.06, 0.08),
(0.11, 0.12) and (0.18, 0.15). For each of these pairs, we have represented the quotient t
∗
k
pk
in Fig. 9. The aim is to show how
the optimal apparent profile becomes proportional to the population’s distribution, as the user approaches the critical-privacy
region. Fig. 9(a) considers the first pair of values. Here, ρ and σ fall into the intervals [ρ6, ρ7] and [σ18, σ17], respectively.
Consistently with Proposition 5, we check that t
∗
1
p1
= · · · = t∗6p6 ' 0.756 and that
t∗18
p18
=
t∗19
p19
' 1.52.
In Fig. 9(b) we double the rates of forgery and suppression. On the one hand, this leads to t
∗
1
p1
= · · · = t∗7p7 . On the other,
the fact that σ ∈ [σ15, σ14] implies that t
∗
15
p15
= · · · = t∗19p19 . It is also interesting to note that, for these relatively small values of
ρ and σ, the final privacy risk is 26% of the initial value D(q ‖ p).
As ρ and σ increase, so does the function φ. The contrary happens with the function χ, which decreases with both rates.
In Fig. 9(c), for example, the proportionality relationship between t∗ and p holds for all except 4 categories. The last pair
(ρ, σ) ' (0.18, 0.15) lies at the boundary of C , as shown in Fig. 8. This implies that t∗p = 1 and therefore that R(ρ, σ) = 0,
as captured in Fig. 9(d).
Having examined the case of a specific user, in our next series of experiments we evaluate the privacy-protection level that
users can achieve if they are disposed to forge and eliminate a fraction of their ratings. For simplicity, we suppose that all
users satisfying the positivity assumption (2) apply a common forgery rate and a common suppression rate. Fig. 10 depicts
the contours of the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile surfaces of relative reduction in privacy risk, for different values of ρ and σ.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this figure.
• First, for relatively small values of ρ and σ (lower than 15%), a vast majority of users lowered privacy risk significantly.
In quantitative terms, we observe in Fig. 10(a) that, for ρ = σ = 0.05, the 10% of users adhered to our technique obtained
a reduction in privacy risk by at least 52.4%. For those same rates of forgery and suppression rates, the 50th and 90th
percentiles are 73.9% and 94.8%. For higher rates, e.g., ρ = σ = 0.15, Fig. 10(b) highlights that half of users experienced
a reduction in privacy risk less than or equal to 100%.
• Secondly, the three percentile surfaces exhibit a certain symmetry with respect to the line ρ = σ. If this symmetry were
exact, the exchange of the rates of forgery and suppression would not have any impact on the resulting privacy-protection
achieved. However, this is not the case. For example, Fig. 10(a) shows a lower reduction in privacy risk for ρ < σ,
particularly accentuated when σ ' 0. The reason for this may be found in the fact that, for most users, ρn is greater than
σ1. We shall elaborate more on this later on when we consider forgery and suppression as pure strategies.
Next, we analyze the privacy protection provided by our technique for ρ, σ ' 0. In the theoretical analysis conducted in
Sec. IV-D we derived an expression for the relative reduction in privacy risk at low rates. Particularly, said expression was in
terms of two factors, namely δρ and δσ . In Fig. 11 we show the probability distribution of these factors. Consistently with
Proposition 8, the minimum values of these factors are δρ ' 3.12 > 1 and δσ ' 2.30 > 0. The maximum values attained by
these forgery and the suppression factors are approximately 324.98 and 266.13. On the other hand, in favour of suppression is
the fact that the percentage of users with δρ > 30 is lower than those users with δσ > 30. More precisely, these percentages
yield 26.8% and 33.1%, respectively. In the end, an eye-opening finding is that δρ > δσ in 43.45% of users, which suggests
introducing a suppression rate higher than that of forgery, at least at low rates.
After analyzing the forgery and the suppression of ratings as a mixed strategy, our last experimental results contemplate the
application of forgery and suppression as pure strategies. In Fig. 12 we illustrate the probability distribution of the critical rates
ρn and σ1. The critical forgery rate ranges approximately from 0.171 to 54.18, and its average is 3.45. The critical suppression
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Fig. 9: Proportionality relationship between, on the one hand, the optimal apparent item distribution t∗ of the user identified as 3301 in our data set, and on
the other, the population’s item distribution p.
rate, on the other hand, goes from 0.153 to 0.963, and its average is 0.632. These figures indicate that, on average, a user will
have either to refrain from rating an item six out of ten times, or submit nearly 3.45 false ratings per each original rating. This
is, of course, when the user wishes to reach the critical-privacy region. Bearing these figures in mind, it is not surprising then
that 95.3% of the users in our data set would opt for suppression as pure strategy, as it comes at the cost of a lower impact
on utility.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the literature of recommendation systems there exists a variety of approaches aimed at protecting user privacy. Among
these approaches, the forgery and the suppression of ratings emerge as a technique that may hinder attackers in their efforts
to accurately profile users on the basis of the items they rate. Our technique does not require that users trust neither the
recommender nor the network operator, it is simple in terms of infrastructure requirements, and it can be used in combination
with other approaches providing soft privacy. However, as any data-perturbative approach, our privacy-enhancing technology
comes at the expense of a loss in data utility, in particular a degradation of the quality of the recommender’s predictions. Put
another way, it poses a trade-off between privacy and utility.
The objective of this paper is to investigate mathematically said trade-off. For this purpose, first we propose a quantitative
measure of both privacy and utility. We quantify privacy risk as the KL divergence between the user’s rating distribution and the
population’s, and measure utility as the fraction of ratings the user is willing to forge and suppress. With these two quantities,
we formulate a multiobjective optimization problem characterizing the trade-off between privacy risk on the one hand, and on
the other forgery rate and suppression rate.
Our theoretical analysis provides a closed-form solution to this problem and characterizes the optimal trade-off surface
between privacy and utility. The solution is confined to the closure of the noncritical-privacy region. The interior of the
critical-privacy region is of no interest as the privacy risk attains its minimum value at the boundary of C¯ . In the region of
interest, our analysis finds that the optimal forgery and suppression strategies are orthogonal. In addition, these two strategies
follow an intuitive principle. The forgery strategy recommends adding ratings to those categories where the user’s interest is
lower than the population’s. The suppression strategy suggests eliminating those ratings belonging to the categories where the
user shows too much interest compared to the reference distribution.
Our theoretical study also examines how these optimal strategies perturb user profiles. It is interesting to observe that the
optimal apparent profile becomes proportional to the population’s distribution in those categories with the lowest and highest
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Fig. 10: We assume that the 4 099 users satisfying the positivity assumption (2) protect their privacy by using a common forgery rate and a common suppression
rate. Under this assumption, we plot some percentiles surfaces of relative reduction in privacy risk, against these two common rates.
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Fig. 11: Probability distribution of the relative decrement factors of forgery and suppression.
ratios qkpk . Our analysis also includes the characterization of R at low rates of forgery and suppression. More accurately, we
provide a first-order Taylor approximation of the privacy-utility trade-off function, from which we conclude that the ratios q1p1
and qnpn determine, together with the quantity D(q ‖ p), the privacy risk at low rates. An eye-opening fact is that the relative
decrement in privacy risk is greater than the forgery rate introduced.
Further, we consider the special case when forgery and suppression are not used in combination. Under this consideration,
we investigate which one is the most appropriate technique, first, in terms of causing the minimum distortion to reach the
critical-privacy region, and secondly, in terms of offering better privacy protection at low rates. Our findings show that the
arithmetic and geometric mean of the maximum and minimum ratios qkpk play a fundamental role in deciding the best technique
to use. Afterwards, our formulation and theoretical analysis are illustrated with a numerical example.
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In the end, the last section is devoted to the experimental evaluation of our data-perturbative mechanism in a real-world
recommendation system. In particular, we examine how the application of the forgery and the suppression of ratings may
preserve user privacy in Movielens. Among other results, we find that a large majority of users significantly reduce privacy risk
for forgery and suppression rates of just 15%. In our data set, the probability distributions of the relative decrement factors
indicate that, at low rates, forgery provides a higher reduction in privacy risk than suppression does. By contrast, we observe
that the suppression relative decrement factor is greater than that of forgery in 43.45% of users. Lastly, we consider the case
when users must opt for either forgery or suppression; and find that the latter is the best strategy to use in 95.3% of users
who wish to vanish privacy risk while causing the minimum distortion.
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